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CHAPTER 11 
Workers' Compensation 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE* 
§ 11.1. Personal injury; mental and emotional injury resulting from good 
faith personnel lay off and transfer; holding limited by 1985 amendment. 
During the 1985 Survey year, 1 in Kelly's Case,2 the Supreme Judicial 
Court addressed the compensability of mental and emotional injury pre-
cipitated by the good faith lay off and transfer of an employee. The Court 
held that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and, 
therefore, was compensable. 3 This holding, however, is superseded in 
part by the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1985.4 
Helen Kelly had worked for a large Massachusetts employer for 
twenty-two years. On August 19, 1977, her supervisor called her aside 
and told her that the company was cutting back her department and that 
she would be laid off.5 She began to cry and went home early. She 
remained upset over the weekend. On Monday, she was told that she 
could transfer to another department as a foreperson. Unhappy with the 
transfer, Kelly subsequently became depressed, developed chest pains, 
and was taken to a hospital. She remained out of work for six weeks, 
and returned to the new department on October 5, 1977. By October 24, 
1977 she had developed further chest pains and was taken to a hospital, 
where she received psychiatric care.6 
*LAURENCE S. LOCKE is a senior partner in the law firm of Laurence Locke and 
Associates, a Wynn and Wynn Law Firm. He is the author of Locke, Massachusetts 
Workers' Compensation Law, 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES (2d ed. 1981) and 1986 and 1987 
Supplements covering the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1985 and the corrective 
changes in 1986. He has been the author of the Survey chapter on Workers' Compensation 
for many years. 
§ ll.l. 1 This chapter covers Massachusetts Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial Court 
cases decided during both 1984 and 1985. No chapter on workers' compensation was 
prepared for the 1984 Survey because all attention was directed toward rewriting the 
workers' compensation act, Acts of 1985, c. 572, known as the Workers' Compensation 
Reform Act of 1985. A few noteworthy cases were decided in the Appeals Court in 1984, 
but they were heard on further appeal by the Supreme Judicial Court and are the main 
topic of this chapter. 
2 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582 (1985). 
3 Id. at 684, 477 N.E.2d at 583. 
4 Acts of 1985, c. 572 § 67, amending G.L. c. 152, § 29. 
5 Kelly, 394 Mass. at 685, 477 N.E.2d at 583. 
6 Id. 
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Based on expert testimony, a single member of the industrial accident 
board found that she was totally disabled from August 22, 1977, and that 
"her depression was caused by her hearing that she was to be laid off 
from one department and transferred to another. "7 The single member 
concluded, however, that the employee had not suffered an injury arising 
out of and in the course of her employment and was not entitled to 
compensation.8 The reviewing board affirmed. On the employee's appeal, 
the superior court reversed the holding of the board, and the Appeals 
Court affirmed this judgment. 9 
In affirming the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court first set 
out the standard of review for the appellate courts. The Court stated that 
the decision of the industrial accident board is to be upheld if warranted 
on the facts and is not to be reversed unless a different conclusion is 
required as a matter of law. 10 The Court concluded that, in this case, the 
law did require a different conclusion. 11 
Referring to holdings in several recent mental and emotional disability 
cases, 12 the Court stated that in none of those cases was it suggested that 
there was any different requirement for the compensability of mental 
injuries than for physical disabilities. 13 Because the single member and 
reviewing board had found that the claimant's disability was the result 
of her hearing that she was to be transferred to a different position, it 
was not in dispute that a work-related event had caused her total dis-
ability. Considering whether this particular stressful event could be con-
sidered to arise out of and in the course of employment, the Court held 
that the news of a good faith personnel transfer or lay off was a stress 
that arose out of and in the course of employment. 14 In reaching that 
result, the Court reiterated the following well-known standards in work-
ers' compensation law: 
(1) A disability arises out of and in the course of employment if it is 
7 /d. at 685-86, 477 N.E.2d at 583. 
8 /d. at 686, 477 N.E.2d at 583. 
9 17 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 462 N.E.2d 348 (1984). 
10 394 Mass. at 686, 477 N.E.2d at 583 (citing Corraro's Case, 380 Mass. 357, 359, 403 
N.E.2d 388, 390 (1980)). 
II /d. 
12 Simmons v. Merchant Mut. Ins. Co., 394 Mass. 1007, 476 N.E.2d 221 (1985), rescript 
opinion; Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 550, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980); Albanese's 
Case, 378 Mass. 14, 389 N.E.2d 83 (1979); Fitzgibbons's Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 
1174 (1978). See Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES,§ 196 
(2d ed. 1981); Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1978 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW,§ 4.2, 
at 83 and Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw,§ 6.1, at 
179. 
13 Kelly, 394 Mass. at 686, 477 N.E.2d at 583. 
14 /d. at 687, 477 N.E.2d at 584. 
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"attributable to the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the 
employment; in other words, [to] employment looked at in any of its 
aspects. "15 
(2) A disability arises out of and in the course of employment even if 
it does not result from an unusual event or a risk greater than that 
experienced by the general public. 16 
(3) An employer takes an employee "'as is,' that is, with whatever 
peculiar vulnerabilities to injury the employee may have. "17 
Turning to the standard of proof required in mental and emotional 
disability cases, the majority rejected the argument that to be compens-
able, an emotional injury need be the result of an unusual, objectively 
stressful event. 18 It distinguished injuries involving the natural progres-
sion of an underlying condition, or bodily "wear and tear." 19 In such 
cases, a causal relationship between employment and disability can only 
be established by showing that the employment exposed the employee 
to an identifiable condition [of the employment] that is not common and 
necessary to all or a great many occupations. 20 
The Court also distinguished Korsun's Case, 21 in which compensation 
was denied an employee who had become emotionally disabled from fear 
that he might lose his job, when, on returning from his vacation, he found 
a whiskey bottle in his work bench. The majority considered Korsun to 
have been based on a lack of evidence of causal connection between the 
emotional disability and any work-related incident. The dissent quoted 
approvingly the language in Korsun that "apprehension over the prospect 
of losing one's job does not arise 'out of the nature, conditions, obliga-
15 /d. (quoting Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940)). 
16 ld. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 /d. This phrase refers to a line of cases in which the Court held that "the gradual 
breaking down or degeneration of tissues caused by long and laborious work is not the 
result of a personal injury within the meaning of the act." Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 
61, 116 N.E. 972, 974 (1917). Otherwise phrased, "bodily wear and tear resulting from a 
long period of hard work is not a compensable injury, even if it diminishes capacity to 
earn." Spalla's Case, 320 Mass. 416, 418, 69 N.E.2d 665, 666 (1946). The doctrine had 
fallen into disuse after 1950, but was reactivated for mental and emotional injury cases in 
Begin's Case, 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968), and for gradual-onset disease cases 
in Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. 590, 433 N.E.2d 869 (1982). See Locke, Workmens' Com-
pensation Law, 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 175 (2d ed. 1981). 
zo Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. at 594, 433 N.E.2d at 872. The Kelly Court clarified the 
scope of this language in Zerofski by limiting it to "wear and tear" cases. Cf. 1981 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAw, § 2.1, which warned against the potential scope of the Zerofski "res-
tatement." This holding of Kelly's Case is a salutary return to the classic workers' com-
pensation doctrines summarized in the text accompanying notes 15 and 16. 
21 354 Mass. 124, 235 N.E.2d 814 (1968). 
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tions or incidents of the employment' .... Rather it is a state of mind 
which arises from the common necessity of working for a living. "22 The 
Kelly Court considered that this broad language referred only to "wear-
and-tear" cases. 23 
In conclusion, the Kelly majority found that an emotional injury pre-
cipitated by the news of a lay off and transfer was an injury arising out 
of and in the course of employment. Furthermore, the Court held that 
the disability was attributable to an incident of employment and such a 
disability need not be the result of an unusual stressful event. 
The decision drew a strong dissent by Chief Justice Hennessey, with 
whom Justices Wilkins and Lynch joined. The dissent recalled that in its 
prior decisions on mental and emotional injuries, the Court had relied on 
findings by the board of a single traumatic event, or a series of specific, 
stressful, work-related incidents, stresses greater than the ordinary 
stresses of everyday life. 24 It repeated that "what is critical in determining 
causation is not the subjective feelings of the employee but the objective 
event triggering the feelings. "25 The dissent regarded the board as justified 
in finding that the event triggering the employee's depression did not 
sufficiently identify the employment as its cause, but to be not more than 
an ordinary stress of everyday work. 26 Therefore, the dissent concluded 
that the employee's disability was noncompensable. 
The Kelly Court recognized that lay offs and job transfers are frequent 
events and that the legislature might wish to consider the issues of public 
policy involved in making emotional injuries resulting from these events 
a cost of doing business in Massachusetts. 27 In an amendment to General 
Laws chapter 152, section 29, the Workers' Compensation Reform Act 
provided, "No mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a 
bona fide, personnel action including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or 
termination except such action which is the intentional infliction of emo-
tional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury within the meaning 
ofthis chapter. "28 The key phrase in the amendment is "arising principally 
out of a bona fide, personnel action." If the personnel action can be 
22 Id. at 128, 235 N.E.2d at 816. 
23 394 Mass. at 688-89, 477 N.E.2d at 585. See supra note 19. 
24 Id. at 690, 477 N.E.2d at 586. 
25 ld. at 690-91, 477 N.E.2d at 586 (citing Fitzgibbon's Case, 374 Mass. 633, 639, 373 
N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (1978)). 
26 ld. at 691, 477 N.E.2d at 586. 
27 Id. at 689, 477 N.E.2d at 585. 
28 Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 67. The exception for intentional infliction of emotional harm 
was designed to keep such cases within the coverage of the workers' compensation act, 
thus barring tort remedies for such claims. See, e.g., Simmons v. Merchant Mut. Ins. Co., 
394 Mass. 1007, 476 N .E.2d 221 (1985), rescript opinion, relying on Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 
381 Mass. 545, 550, 413 N.E.2d 711, 714 (1980). 
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shown to have been other than routine or ordinary, in that the claimant 
was singled out for special treatment, or the notification was made in an 
unusual or dramatic manner that could be identified as a specific, work-
related traumatic event, then the disability could be found compensable. 
Similarly, if there had been a specific event or series of specific events 
occurring within the employment, preceding the personnel action, and it 
could be shown that these were a significant contributing cause of the 
disability, and that the personnel action was not the principle cause, then 
the disability could be found compensable. 
The legislature also addressed the issue whether there should be a 
higher standard of proof in mental and emotional disability cases. In an 
amendment to General Laws chapter 152, section 1(7A), the legislature 
provided "Personal injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities 
only where a contributing cause of such disability is an event or series 
of events occurring within the employment. "29 This amendment rules out 
compensation for mental injury cases resulting from gradual or prolonged 
stress, without a specific event or series of events. 30 
The legislature did not require that the stressful event be unusual or 
in some way out of the ordinary. Nor did it require that the event be 
"objectively" stressful, whatever that term means. Kelly remains the 
authoritative construction of the compensation act on this issue. 
§ 11.2. Incapacity-Partial Disability Despite Higher Post-injury Earn-
ings as a Result of Working Longer Hours-Legislative Reversal-Current 
Criteria for Partial Disability Benefits. Compensation is not awarded for 
a personal injury alone, but for a personal injury resulting in "incapacity 
for work. " 1 Incapacity combines the medical element of harm to the body 
and the economic element of loss of earning capacity. Depending on the 
degree of loss of earning capacity, incapacity for work may be total or 
partial. "The goal of disability adjudication is to make a realistic appraisal 
of the medical effect of a physical injury on the individual claimant and 
award compensation for the resulting impairment of earning capacity, 
discounting all other factors. "2 Taking this goal into consideration, in 
Sjoberg's Case,3 the Supreme Judicial Court held that income due to 
29 G.L. c. 152, § 1(7A), as amended by Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 11. The legislature also 
provided for special impartial medical examiners in claims of mental or emotional disability. 
G.L. c. 152, § llA, as amended by Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 25. 
3° Cf Begin's Case, 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968). See supra note 19. 
§ 11.2. 1 Zeigale's Case, 325 Mass. 128, 129-30, 89 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1949) ("Compen-
sation is not awarded for the injury as such but rather for an impairment of earning capacity 
caused by the injury."). 
2 Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MAss. PRACTICE SERIES § 321, at 375 (2d 
ed. 1981) (cited in Ballard's Case, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1068, 434 N.E.2d 1306 (1982)). 
3 394 Mass. 458, 476 N.E.2d 196 (1985). 
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factors other than the injury should not be included in an employee's 
post-injury loss of earning capacity for the purposes of determining partial 
incapacity compensation. The Court's decision was superseded by the 
legislature, however, in new section 35D of the amended Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 4 Section 35D substituted a legislative measure of incapac-
ity for work for the previous administrative/judicial interpretation. 
In Sjoberg's Case, the claimant, a pressman and molder, suffered a 
back injury on June 12, 1978, when he was earning $302.31 per week. 5 
After two brief periods of total incapacity he returned to work, but his 
back remained stiff and sore. After losing a bid for a less strenuous job, 
he submitted his resignation. He later filed a claim for continuing partial 
incapacity benefits from the date of his resignation. Based on a thirty-
seven hour week and an hourly rate in excess of eight dollars, at the time 
of his resignation his average weekly wage was still $302.31.6 After his 
resignation, he obtained various less demanding jobs, and in 1981, by 
working over 50 hours, his average weekly wage was $317.48, although 
his hourly rate was only $4.50. 7 On this evidence, the single member of 
the Industrial Accident Board found that he had a diminished earning 
capacity, notwithstanding his higher actual earnings, and awarded partial 
disability compensation of forty dollars per week. 8 This award was af-
firmed by the reviewing board, and the insurer's appeal was dismissed 
by the superior court. 9 
The Appeals Court affirmed the decision of the board on the issue of 
partial incapacity. The issue, the court noted, is not what the employee 
is actually earning but what amount he is capable of earning. 10 If his post-
injury earnings are higher because of factors other than his injury, his 
income due to these factors is not to be taken into account. The court 
stated, "[w]here, as here, the board found an impairment of earning 
capacity and a reduced per hour wage, we see no reason to deny com-
pensation because the diminution in earning capacity is concealed by the 
longer hours worked."11 
On further appeal, the insurer argued to the Supreme Judicial Court 
that an award of partial compensation is controlled by the actual post-
injury earnings of the employee and cannot exceed the difference between 
4 See G.L. c. 152, § 350(1), inserted by Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 45. 
5 Sjoberg's Case, 394 Mass. at 459, 476 N.E.2d at 197. 
6 Id. at 461, 476 N.E.2d at 198. 
7 ld. 
8 Id. at 459, 476 N.E.2d at 197. 
9 ld. at 460, 476 N.E.2d at 197. 
10 18 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1984). 
11 ld. at 3-4, 462 N.E.2d at 355 (citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MASS. 
PRACTICE SERIES § 343, at 402 (2d ed. 1981)). 
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the prior average weekly wage and the amount he earns. 12 Rejecting this 
reasoning, the Court stated that because the legislature had not specified 
a method of computing "the average weekly wage [the employee] is able 
to earn thereafter," 13 the Court must give due deference to the adminis-
trative interpretation by the Industrial Accident Board, in matters which 
are within its scope. 14 The Court reasoned that the board "properly could 
find that the employee had 'a significant impairment of earning capacity 
concealed within an income equal to his former wage .... "'15 The Court 
concluded, "[t]hus, it was not error for the board to conclude that over-
time payments, income from special projects, or income derived from 
non-employment sources should not be included in the employee's post-
injury 'average weekly wage. '" 16 
Commentators and practitioners alike have struggled with the problem 
of how to reflect the true loss of earning capacity suffered by a worker 
with a long-term impairment. When the loss is made up of factors that 
are difficult to quantify, such as loss of fringe benefits and seniority 
protection in the prior job, or are hidden by erosion of actual wage loss 
by a general rise in wages, income from non-employment sources, or 
post-injury wages based on longer hours at a lower wage rate, as in 
Sjoberg, the difficulty is acute. In periods of rising wages based on 
inflation, too often a true loss of earning capacity has been concealed by 
general wage increases. This issue has disturbed courts and text writers 
for the past three decades. 17 But the appropriate response to continuing 
partial incapacity compensation from the viewpoint of workers' compen-
sation analysis may not reflect the economic and political realities that 
the legislature had to deal with in drafting a major revision of the com-
pensation act in 1985. 
The 1985 Reform Act made two major changes in benefits for partial 
incapacity. First, it reduced the weekly benefit from 100% of the differ-
ence between the former average weekly wage and the wage the em-
ployee is able to earn thereafter to two-thirds of the difference. However, 
it also raised the maximum period for receipt of such benefits from 250 
weeks (including any period of total incapacity benefits) to 600 weeks, 
almost twelve years. 18 Second, it added a limited cost of living adjustment 
12 Sjoberg, 394 Mass. at 460, 476 N.E.2d at 198. 
13 G.L. c. 152, § 35. 
14 Sjoberg, 394 Mass. at 460, 476 N.E.2d at 198. 
15 /d. at 461, 476 N.E.2d at 198 (citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MAss. 
PRACTICE SERIES § 343 at 402 (2d ed. 1981)). 
16Jd. 
17 See the important discussion by Arthur Larson in volume 2 of his highly regarded 
treatise, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION § 57.21 (1983) cited in Sjoberg's Case, 394 Mass. at 
461 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 198 n.2. 
18 G.L. c. 152, § 35, effective January I, 1986, amended by Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 44. 
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for recipients of partial incapacity benefits. 19 In light of these legislative 
responses, the problems created by Sjoberg's exclusion of factors outside 
of the injury in determining an employee's post-injury loss of earning 
capacity become apparent. First, if the principle of Sjoberg's Case were 
to apply without restriction over the 600 weeks of compensable partial 
disability, the premium cost would be substantial. Secondly, if a partially 
disabled worker were to be paid benefits for his full loss of earning 
capacity, despite all other non-impairment factors, the economic cost on 
the employer might well approximate the economic loss suffered by the 
injured worker! Daunted by the prospect of the substantial economic cost 
to the employer community, a restriction of the Sjoberg rule became a 
bargaining chip in the political negotiations that led to the passage of the 
1985 Reform Bill. In response to the employer's concerns, the legislature 
enacted General Laws chapter 152, section 35D(l) which measures the 
loss of earning capacity by the actual wage earned. 20 Because the Reform 
Bill contained a number of important benefit increases, it seemed a small 
matter for the legislature to restrict Sjoberg and make the actual wage 
the employee earns the measure of his loss of earning capacity. 
A discussion of other features introduced by the legislature in General 
Laws chapter 152, section 35D as well as other provisions of the Reform 
Act affecting the benefits for loss of earning capacity is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. 21 
11.3. Third Party Suits-Common Employment Doctrine--Temporary 
Labor. It is now fifteen years since the legislature by chapter 941 of the 
Acts of 1971 abolished the common employment doctrine, but the mem-
ory lingers on. The doctrine plagued injured workers seeking third party 
recovery for the negligence of individuals and employers who were in 
some way affiliated with each other in an enterprise.' Two recent cases 
have emphasized that, as the statute intended, the doctrine has indeed 
been abolished. 
In Searcy v. Pau/,2 a window cleaner was injured when he fell from a 
ladder while working at an apartment complex. He brought a negligence 
action against a number of co-defendants who were affiliated in financing, 
constructing, and managing the complex.3 He also brought a workers' 
19 G.L. c. 152, § 35F, effective November I, 1986, inserted by Acts of 1985, c. 572, § 45. 
20 G.L. c. 152, § 35D(l), Stat. 1985, c. 572, § 45. 
21 For a fuller discussion, see Locke, Workemens' Compensation Law Supplements to 
29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES (1986) and (1987). 
§ 11.3. 'See Locke, Workmens' Compensation Law, 29 MAss. PRACTICE SERIES 
§§ 663-665 (2d ed. 1981). 
2 20 Mass. App. Ct. 134, 478 N.E.2d 1275 (1985). 
3 Id. at 135, 478 N.E.2d at 1276. 
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compensation claim against Vortex, one of the defendants, asserting he 
was an employee of Vortex. This claim was eventually settled by a lump 
sum, approved by the industrial accident board.4 A pretrial motion for 
summary judgment was brought alleging that the lump sum settlement 
barred the tort action against all the defendants. It was allowed as to 
Vortex, but denied as to the others.5 A verdict of $112,500 was returned 
against two of the defendants, and a directed verdict was allowed as to 
the third, a bank. 6 On appeal, the judgments were affirmed. 
The Appeals Court, relying on the 1971 amendment to General Laws 
chapter 152, section 15, held that it meant just what it said and allowed 
"a corporation's employee to bring actions for negligence against third 
parties, either individuals or corporations, even if in some degree affili-
ated with the injured employer corporation (at least where no joint ven-
ture with another corporation is established)."7 The court found no basis 
for extending the Massachusetts decisions with respect to "disregarding 
the corporate fiction," under the circumstances of the case. 
In Lang v. Edward J. Lamothe Co., 8 a temporary laborer was sent by 
his employer, Peakload, to work for the defendant on its premises. He 
was supervised by an employee of the defendant. After his injury, he 
received workers' compensation from his employer's insurance company 
and brought this action for negligence.9 A judge of the superior court 
rejected the defendant's claim that the Workers' Compensation Act was 
the exclusive remedy, relying on the 1971 amendment to section 15, 
applied in Searcy v. Paul, and the additional language pertaining to 
general and special employers in section 18 of the Act. 10 The court 
adopted the reasoning of the superior court judge that, in these circum-
stances, for an employer to be immune from common law action, the 
employer must satisfy a two-part test: "(1) the employer must be an 
insured person liable for the payment of compensation, and (2) the em-
ployer must be the direct employer of the employee."" Meeting the 
provisions of the amendment to section 18, Peakload provided workers' 
compensation insurance and had no agreement with the defendant that 
it would be responsible for payment of compensation. 12 The defendant 
4 ld. 
5 /d. at 136, 478 N .E.2d at 1277. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. at 139, 478 N.E.2d at 1278. 
8 20 Mass. App. Ct. 231, 479 N.E.2d 208 (1985). 
9 Id. at 232, 479 N.E.2d at 209. 
10 Jd. at 232, 479 N.E.2d at 209 (citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MASS. 
PRACTICE SERIES § 150 (2d ed. 1981); Acts of 1969, c. 755, § 2). 
II Jd. 
12 Id. at 232-33, 479 N.E.2d at 210. 
9
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therefore could not satisfy the first part of the test, as it was not liable 
for the payment of compensation to the plaintiff. 
Both decisions are sound. It would be hoped that they would put to 
rest the vestigial remnants of the common employment doctrine and its 
progeny. 
11.4. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies--Practice and Procedure--
Insurer's Right to Interplead Another Insurer. During the Survey year, 
the Appeals Court addressed the issue of what procedure an insurer 
should follow to transfer the burden of compensation onto the insurer in 
fact providing the employer with workers' compensation coverage at the 
time of the injury when another insurer had voluntarily undertaken to 
pay compensation under the mistaken impression that it was the insurer 
covering the employer's compensation risk. In Utica Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 1 Utica began payment of compen-
sation by agreement in January, 1981. In July, it discovered that Liberty 
had provided compensation coverage for the employer on the date of 
injury.2 After some discussions between the two insurers, Liberty de-
clined to accept the case voluntarily. In October, Utica requested a 
conference before the Industrial Accident Board to discontinue compen-
sation on the ground that Liberty was the insurer liable on the claim. 3 
Both companies were present at the conference. In February, 1982, the 
single member presiding at the conference denied the request and ordered 
Utica to continue payments. But before the member had issued the order, 
Utica began the present action against Liherty in superior court, seeking 
reimbursement for all payments made. 4 Later, it settled the compensation 
claim with the employee. Utica sought reimbursement of all amounts 
paid, including the lump sum. The superior court found for Utica and 
Liberty appealed. 5 
The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on the ground that Utica 
had begun this action without exhausting its administrative remedies. 
The court stated that the superior court should not have decided the case 
on its merits because at the time the action was brought, there were still 
remedies available to it within the administrative scheme established by 
the workers' compensation act. 6 That the controversy here involved two 
insurers, the court noted, made the case peculiarly appropriate for ad-
§ 11.4. ' 19 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 473 N.E.2d 722 (1985). 
2 /d. at 263, 473 N.E.2d at 723. 
'ld. at 264, 473 N.E.2d at 723. 
4 /d. at 264, 473 N.E.2d at 724. 
5Jd. 
6 /d. (citing Broderick's Case, 320 Mass. 149, 67 N.E.2d 897 (1946); Assuncao's Case, 
372 Mass. 6, 8, 359 N.E.2d 1304, 1305 (1976)). 
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ministrative adjudication, particularly where Liberty raised issues of 
causal relation and prejudice. 7 
Addressing Utica's contention that there was no procedure for bringing 
Liberty before the board as a party, unless the employee filed a claim 
against Liberty, the court held, [t]here is nothing in c. 152 which prevents 
the board from joining a third party against whom a claim has not been 
made by an employee but whose presence is necessary to dispose com-
pletely of the claim.8 The board's rule-making power, the court stated, 
allows the board considerable latitude. Its practice is governed by the 
practice in equity and equity may be used "to supply a remedy' [even] 
where there [may be] a gap in the statute. "9 The court concluded that 
the board "may join, by any means reasonably calculated to give notice 
and a right to be heard, any other insurer or insurers it deems necessary 
for the expeditious and complete disposition of a controversy like the 
present one. "10 
Although neither the 1985 Reform Act nor the prior rules of the board 
provided for joinder or interpleader, the Regulations issued by the Com-
missioner of the Department of Industrial Accidents now provide for 
joinder on the motion of a party or on the administrative judge's initia-
tive.11 
§ 11.5. Amount of Compensation-Rate on Date of Final Decision-G.L. 
c. 152, § 51A; Whether Applicable to Separate Benefit Provisions. In 1969, 
the legislature inserted section 51A providing, "[i]n any claim in which 
no compensation has been paid prior to the final decision on such claim, 
said final decision shall take into consideration the compensation pro-
vided by statute on the date of the decision. "1 It had been argued that 
even though compensation was being paid under one section (as for total 
incapacity under section 34), a claim under another section (as for specific 
compensation under section 36) would be limited by section 51A if the 
insurer resisted the claim and it became the subject of an award by final 
7 Id. at 265, 473 N.E.2d at 724. 
8 Id. at 267, 473 N.E.2d at 725 (citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MASS. 
PRACTICE SERIES § 179 (2d ed. 1981)). 
9 ld. (citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 179 
(2d ed. 1981)). The court stated that "[t]his concept would appear (at least in this context) 
to incorporate prior equity procedure under which an adjudicative tribunal could, on its 
own motion, order a case to stand in order that an indispensable party might be joined." 
Id. at 267 n.5, 473 N.E.2d at 725 n.5. 
10 Id. at 267-68, 473 N.E.2d at 726. 
11 See 42 CMR 1.20. MAss. REGS. CoDE tit. 42, § 1.20. 
§ ll.5. 1 G.L. c. 152, § 51A, inserted by Acts of 1969, c. 833, § I. See Locke, Work-
men's Compensation Law, 29 MAss. PRACTICE SERIES§ 302 at n.l8; McLeod's Case, 389 
Mass. 431, 450 N.E.2d 612 (1983). 
11
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decision. In Madariaga's Case, 2 the Appeals Court rejected this argu-
ment. In Madariaga, an insurer paying death benefits under section 31 
resisted payment of benefits under sections 36 and 36A for losses of 
bodily function and disfigurement suffered by a deceased employee.3 The 
insurer argued that the losses could be said to result from brain injury, 
to which the legislature, after the employee's injury, had placed a limit 
of $20,000.4 Because the insurer had resisted the claim under sections 36 
and 36A, the insurer contended that section 51A applied, and therefore 
its liability was limited to $20,000.5 The court rejected the argument, 
holding that the payment under section 31 rendered section 51A inappl-
icable.6 The court stated, "[w]e perceive no legislative intention in the 
words from § 51A ... to make any separation of 'compensation' based 
upon the section of c. 152 under which particular compensation was 
paid. "7 
The court further suggested that section 51A might not apply where 
benefits were reduced after the date of injury.8 Quoting the language of 
the Supreme Judicial Court in McLeod's Case,9 the Appeals Court 
pointed out that the intent of the legislature was to avoid obsolesence of 
compensation rates. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, has not yet 
decided whether section 51A would apply to a case where there was a 
decrease in benefits after the date of injury. 10 
2 19 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 475 N.E.2d 753 (1985). 
3 Id. at 478, 475 N.E.2d at 754. 
4 Id. at 482, 475 N.E.2d at 756. 
5 ld. 
6 Id. at 482, 475 N.E.2d at 757. 
7 Id. at 483 n.7, 475 N.E.2d at 757 n.7. 
8 Id. at 483, 475 N.E.2d at 757. 
9 Id. (quoting McLeod's Case, 389 Mass. 431, 435, 450 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1983)). 
10 ld. (citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 29 MAss. PRACTICE SERIES§ 30 at 
39-40 (2d ed. 1981)). 
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